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In retrospect, the early 1990s can be regarded as a threshold in the post-war history of Japan's political economy. In the political domain, the half-century-long, one-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came to an end in 1993. By then it also became clear that the bubble in financial and real-estate markets had burst. These two events ushered in a period of unprecedented uncertainties, as well as various trials and errors in the polity and the economy in response to them. Economy-wise, this period is conventionally characterized as a prolonged deflationary phase 1 and many have blamed the faults of the macro-economic policy for the malaise. It became the fashion among the media, and even in academia, to dub the period a "lost decade," referring to the losses of wealth, growth potential, secure permanent-employment jobs and even social morale. Challenging this popular view, I have been maintaining for a few years by now that the past decade may be more properly characterized as a decade of flux, meaning an unfinished period of institutional change. 2 Underlying the apparent depression, competition among firms became keener during the period and managerial responses to the challenge of deflationary pressures, as well as the rise of industrial China, the IT revolution and so on, have steadily differentiated the better performers from the laggards and losers in the industry. Through this process, economic practices have been undergoing various changes of substantial magnitude.
In the political domain, the LDP eventually returned to the position of ruling r * This article is written as Afterwo d for M. Aoki, G. Jackson and H. Miyajima (eds.) , Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity, to be published by Oxford University Press. The Table of Contents of the book is provided at the end of this article. I am grateful to Takao Kato, Curtis Milhaupt and contributors to the book for useful suggestions and critical comments. 1 This popular characterization is somewhat mistaken in that the Japanese economy actually registered a positive growth rate in the mid-1990s. 2 A series of my essays on this view were collected in Aoki [2002] . party in coalition with other parties, but the continuity of its power could no longer be taken for granted without electoral support. This competitive prospect in the polity has been ushering in gradual changes in the power structures of politicians and their relationships with various interest groups and bureaucrats. 3 These changes in the economic and political domains have been mutually reinforcing each other. Thus, I posit that although there may not have been any single event signaling a dramatic institutional change in either the political or economic domain, the cumulative effects of incremental changes are already substantial and irreversible. This evolutionary process is still ongoing and it's likely to continue for some time, even for another decade or more, for the reasons I will soon argue.
A corporate governance institution, roughly understood as the accepted rules of the game among the corporate stakeholders governing the corporation, is not an exception. In this domain as well, there have been changes in formal laws, practices, relationships with the polity, etc., so that the old rules of the game can no longer be taken for granted, but new rules are still being sought and are in the process of evolving. However, this may be a good time for us to take stock of the cumulative changes achieved so far, and examine their implications and prospects with the help of the factual information and empirical analysis that has been assembled in preceding chapters of this book, as well as the analytical tools developed in comparative institutional analysis. This Afterword provides a tentative note in that direction.
It is composed as follows: Section 1 provides some illustrative evidence of changes that are taking place in Japan's corporate landscape.
However, without a certain conceptual framework, the anecdotal evidence alone may not be sufficient for us to infer whether Japan's corporate governance is making a substantive institutional transformation; and, if it is, in which direction. Therefore in the following two sections, we make a detour into theoretical discussions. First, we discuss how corporate governance can be generally understood as an institution and thus its change as an institutional change. Second, we present four stylized analytical models of corporate governance and try to identify the conditions that could make respective models viable (i.e., institutionalized). Then in Section 4 we return to Japanese scene and examine the driving forces, as well as the historical constraints, of changes in the corporate landscape. By interpreting these factors in the light of previous theoretical discussion, the last section indicates that the nature of on-going institutional change in Japan's corporate governance can be interpreted as a possible transition from the traditional bank-oriented model to a hybrid model, which attends to possible complementarities between a managerial choice of business model, employees' human assets, and stock market evaluations. External monitoring by an informative stock market would help, if not exclusively, evaluate the valuable internal linkage between a managerial business model and specific human assets. Stock market signals summarize a variety of information, expectations and values prevailing in the economy. However, for effective corporate governance to be implemented, there needs to be a further firm-specific mechanism to translate those signals into a selection/replacement of management, whenever appropriate, which constitutes the core of corporate governance. In this regard, no single mechanism has emerged as a dominant pattern, but a variety of patterns seems to be evolving and a reason for it will be discussed.
Changing Corporate Landscape: Anecdotal Evidence
In order to highlight the changes taking place in the Japan's corporate landscape in the past decade or so, let us first quote the stylized features of the preceding system, --which we will refer to as the traditional J-system for the sake of referential convenience. 4 They are:
Top management of the corporate firm was considered the pinnacle of the career ladder for permanent employees. The Board of Directors, almost exclusively composed of insiders, functioned as a substructure of top management (the representative directors).
One of the main objectives of management was to provide steadily growing benefits to its permanent employees in the form of seniority wages, promotion opportunities, bonus and severance payments, fringe benefits and so on, subject to a reasonable level of profits (the so-called "J-firm").
The main bank was the major supplier of funds to the corporate firm.
Other financial institutions and investors expected the main bank to be a principal monitor of the firm (the so-called "delegated monitoring"). The main bank did not overtly intervene with the management of firms in excellent corporate-value state, but was expected to decide whether to bail out and restructure firms in a critical corporate-value state at its own cost, or liquidate them (the so-called "contingent governance").
The government regulated the banking industry to assure rents to individual banks according to their ranking. It also intervened, if necessary, to bail out financially distressed banks or arrange for their acquisition by healthier banks (the so-called "Convoy system"). More broadly, this system is embedded in the following unique political-economy institution.
One-party rule by the LDP was taken for granted. Under such political stability, triadic coalitions among LDP politicians, interest groups and ministerial bureaucrats were formed in parallel along various industrial, occupational and professional lines to protect mutual vested interests of the incumbents (the so-called "bureau-pluralism or "compartmentalized pluralism [shikirareta tagenshugi]).
The traditional J-system characterized by these features started to ebb even in the 1980s. 5 However, it was only after the bubble burst that changes became evident. In contrast to the above features of the traditional J-system, we now observe:
Corporate Code reform in 2002 made corporate firms to choose between two options for board structure: the American-type system with independent subcommittees (on auditing, managerial compensation and nomination) or a modified traditional system with a semi-independent statutory auditor's board (Gilson and Milahaupt[2004] which suffered from non-performing loans to land speculators worth seven trillion yen. Agricultural cooperative financial institutions were major lenders to these companies, while banks were major owner-cum-lenders. The agricultural interests were able to recover most 9 This company, founded by a then-college-student named Horie with Y6 million initial capital in the late 1990s, increased its market value to Y800billion in 2005. But in 2006 the top management was indicted by the Public Prosecutors Office for corporate account fraud and spreading false financial information. 10 Another legal case which may be considered even more important than the case of LD vs. NBS in the sense of involvement of established firms is the one in which Sumitomo Trust Bank (STB) appealed an injunction of the merger of two mega financial institutions, Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG) and UFJ, in 2004 on the ground that STB had a prior agreement to be merged with the trust division of UFJ. This appeal was denied by the court, but it is said that since the incident even traditional firms have become very careful about how to draw contracts with each other in order to avoid possible law suits. This one-issue platform was meant to be targeted at the so-called "reform-resisting power," i.e., coalitions between politicians (both inside and outside the LDP), specific interest groups, and the bureaucracy. He succeeded in expelling those politicians opposing to the privatization from the LDP. Thus the institution of buraupluralism seems to face a critical phase. 14 12 For example, an integrated steel company reduced the size of permanent employees by more than half, although it was said to have cost them about thirty million yen per employee in severance payments and early retirement incentives. Partly through the employment reduction and partly through the recovery of markets, its market value increased fourfold in 2005. 13 Kato [2001] contrasted the job retention rates of Japanese and U.S. work before and after the burst of the bubble. It turned out that the job retention rates of Japanese employees did not fall significantly from the period prior to the burst of the bubble economy in the late 1980s to the post-bubble period. 14 After the end of the one-party dominance of the LDP in 1993, a change in the parliamentary election system from a multiple-seat district system to a single-seat district system was introduced and several elections have taken place since then in both the Upper and Lower Houses. In the old system, politicians from the same party representing different interest groups were electable in tandem in each district. Thus, interest mediation within the ruling party and through the administrative process (e.g., budgetary expenditures, entry-restricting regulations) became a political focal point, The facts cited above are meant to be only illustrative at this point. But in taking them together, it may be hard not to have an impression of considerable changes in the landscape of Japan's corporate world and its environment. But is this impression substantiated? In other words, is Japan's corporate world in general, and corporate governance in particular, undergoing an irreversible change? If so, in which direction? Is the stock market discipline going to exercise a dominant impact on corporate management as in the U.S.? 15 Can the management afford not to heed to the voice of the employees any more? Or, is the reduction in the size of permanent employees just an inevitable, temporary reaction to the prolonged deflation and does the old model still persist? Alternatively, is Japan's corporate sector in the process of an earnest search for a model of its own, adaptable to the evolving environment? If so, is it moving in a "good" or "bad" direction? 16 In what way are changes in the corporate domain related to changes in the political domain? To consider these and related issues, it may be helpful to introduce first a coherent conceptual and analytical framework of institutional analysis, by which several prototypes of corporate governance structure, as well as associated fitting conditions, can be identified.
How Corporate Governance Can Be Understood as an Institution
leading to the institutionalization of bureau-pluralism. However, after the electoral system change, it has become increasingly difficult for politicians representing a particular interest group to be elected. Thus the power of the Prime Minister in policy-making and endorsing party candidates has been gradually strengthened. The 2005 election may be regarded as a spectacular manifestation of this on-going tendency. 15 Actually even in the U.S., some evidence seems to point to the rather weak stock market discipline (e.g., statistically significant yet economically insignificant pay-performance sensitivities and the "trouble with stock options"). To this end, the ongoing controversy between the optional contracting school (e.g., Murphy[2002] ) and the managerial power school (e.g., Bebchuk et al [2002] ) may be important and informative. 16 Such normative question is raised explicitly only by Dore [Chapter 13] in this book. Below I will not deal with the normative issue as such, but implicitly suggest ways by which evolving patterns could be improved for better corporate performance. My stance may appear somewhat at odds with Dore's critical position of the present trend, but this difference may be reduced to a difference in assessing whether the present trend is toward the American-type system (Dore) or not (myself).
An important conceptual issue was first raised in a seminal debate between Dodd and Bearle in the early 1930s regarding whether the corporation is the property of the stockholders, or if the board should owe fiduciary duties to the stakeholders in general. It does not seem that this issue has been resolved yet. One view became more powerful and prevalent at one time, but then to be replaced by the other in response to emergent business landscape, particular events (such as the Asian financial crisis, the Enron scandal) and so on. Notwithstanding this unsettled fundamental issue, corporate governance has been regarded for a long time as a matter of legal design. True, the kinds of recent changes in the structure and composition of board rooms in Japan, as referred to above, would not have been possible without formal changes in the Commercial Code. However, even if formal rules are written, there is no guarantee that they will be followed and/or enforced as the legislators intended. 17 Visions of corporate governance implicit in a law will become viable and sustainable only if it generates the For example, the old Japanese Commercial Code was exceptionally generous to the stockholders in that a proposal for the election and replacement of the board members could be made at a stockholders' meeting by any stockholder who owned at least one percent of the stock. However, this statutory provision provided incentives among the managers to devise countermeasures to preserve their autonomy: such as implicitly colluding among themselves to hold stockholders' meetings on the same day of each year or implicitly or secretly bribing professional trouble makers, called sokaiya, who collected minority shares. Such practices are now fading, however, because more stringent law enforcement and increasing public awareness of corporate social responsibility reinforce each other.
jeer at the players/referees in one way or another. Simplifying the game-like discussion, let us first consider only the following four generic classes of stakeholders as the players of the game: the investors who invest in financial instruments issued by firms; the employees who invest in organization-specific human assets; the manager who directs the use of these financial and human resources in "non-contractible" events, 18 but who may have interests of his or her own (e.g., income, career concerns, perks, prestige, social reputation, etc.); and the consumers who collectively assess the activities of the firm by buying or not buying its outputs (i.e., the market).
Depending on its market performance (i.e., market evaluation by the consumers), the firm may be roughly in either of three states in producing value: excellent, normal, or depressed. The gross value added by the firm may be distributed among the investors, the employees, and the manager according to certain rules (by contracts, conventions, discretion, etc.). Each of them may be happy or unhappy with the outcome. In response, the investors and the employees will strategically choose their actions. In particular, in the depressed corporate-value state, they may choose some punishment or non-cooperation against the manager, possibly with the help of other parties (such as the court, take-over raiders, reorganization specialists, industrial unions, the government, etc.). In anticipation of these responses, the manager will adapt his behavior and choices in the use of financial and human resources under its command beforehand.
We can then identify a firm's corporate governance mechanism with a set of rules (formal or informal) that regulate the action choices of the stakeholders contingent on the value state of the firm. In particular, the crux of such a mechanism may be in the managers' behavioral beliefs regarding the plausible strategic reactions of other parties in the depressed corporate-value state. 19 Such beliefs would in turn constrain and discipline his or her action choices ex ante (in other contingencies). If such a set of rules is believed to operate generally across firms, we refer to it as a corporate governance institution. This corresponds to a situation in which typical parties will not expect a unilateral deviation from it to be beneficial so they will comply with it. 20 Rules embodied in statutory law can constitute part of a corporate governance institution if every concerned party expects that the enforcer himself finds it beneficial to enforce them (fearing the loss of social reputation, punishment, public criticism, etc.). But there are self-enforcing rules not necessarily enforced by the law enforcer.
Examples of these are customs, self-enforcing contracts and agreements (due to reputation concerns, trust, etc.), implicit collusions among a subclass of concerned parties, and so on.
I claim that this institution-as-self-sustaining-rules view has several advantages. 21 Particularly, we can identify multiple sets of rules that are viable under certain conditions, thus a diversity of institutions, rather than enumerate them on an ad hoc basis or regard only a certain particular set of rules viable and/or normatively correct. Certainly a set of rules to guarantee the "maximum returns to the investors" as the only "owner of corporate property" 22 could be one possibility, but it may not be the only one. Furthermore, we can identify conditions, such as the institutional characteristics of the polity, prevailing social norms, labor relations, historical legacy and so on, that fit each of the possible models so that we can predict which kind of institution is likely to emerge under certain conditions.
Four Prototype Institutions of Corporate Governance
In the literature various types of corporate governance structures are discussed and their advantages and disadvantages are compared. In this section I briefly describe four stylized models of corporate governance. All of them except for the last are derived from rigorously formulated game-theoretic models. 23 Thus all of them are bound to have unrealistic features in certain respects as a description of an actual corporate governance institution. However, they can be useful for pinpointing 20 This corresponds to the "institution-as-equilibrium" view. See Aoki [2001] and Greif [2006] for this view. 21 For more detail, see Aoki [2001] A crucial assumption of his is that of complementarities between the managerial ability that is malleable with his/her effort and the right to control the use of physical assets in non-contractible events.
That is, the value of the manager's incremental effort is assumed to be enhanced, if (s)he has discretionary rights for deciding how physical assets are to be used. If this is the case, then it follows that it is more efficient for the manager to own physical assets, provided that (s)he is not financially constrained. The employees may be contracted according to the level of firm-specific skills in which they invested. The value that the firm produces net of the contractual payments to the employees accrues to the owner-cum-manager as profit. This is the case of a neo-classical proprietor-run firm. If the manager is financially constrained and needs to rely on equity financing, then (s)he has to yield fundamental control rights to the stockholders and be subjected to an incentive contractual arrangement as an agent of the stockholders. The present value sum of expected streams of profit accruing to the stockholders is called the fundamental stock value [Note the distinction between the (gross) value-added by the firm inclusive of contractual payments to the employees and the stock value of the firm as residual after them]. The fear of replacement in the job in the event of a financially depressed state (i.e., career concerns), as well as the prospect of incentive payments in the event of an excellent corporate-value state, motivates the manager to make the best effort. Under this scheme, an investor who conceives of a new business plan to enhance the stock value may 24 The following is an interpretation of the main points analyzed in Hart [2005] In this setting, more external financing will be made in the form of long-term debt contracts than in the SS model. This is so, because in the context of co-determination, the investors and the employees have common preferences for debt-contacts in order to control the risky behavior of the manager, while the manager prefers to limit the residual rights of control by the stockholders. See Aoki [2001] pp.287-291 for a rigorous analysis. A proof of institutional complementarities between codetermination and the corporatist state is also given there.
hand, and between private employment contracting and the liberal state, on the other.
Relational Contingent Governance (RCG model). Instead of an exclusive complementary relationship between managerial effort and control rights over physical assets, assume that contributions to the gross value of the firm by the manager and the employees are mutually indistinguishable, while the physical resources supplied by outsiders are non-specific. In this case, an efficient governance structure dictates that the insiders (the employees and the managers) ought to hold control rights in excellent and normal corporate-value states, as well as receive residuals after contractual payments to the outsiders (the investors). As contributions of individual insiders to the total value are not clearly distinguishable, however, payments to them need to be regulated by organization-specific rules (such as payment by seniority, simple sharing, etc.) rather than as individual performance-based payments.
In financially distressed state a particular monitoring agent ought to gain control rights and decide whether firm-specific human assets should be bailed out for continuation value or punished by the termination of the firm in the worst case, depending on the nature and magnitude of the crisis. Since the control rights shift between the insiders and the monitoring agent, contingent on the corporate-value state of the firm, this model can be called the contingent governance model. 26 As bailing out is often costly than liquidation in the short run for the monitoring agent, some rents need to be assured for it to be induced to assume the costs when necessary. Such rents can be guaranteed, if the agent can expect stable fees from long-run relationships with multiple firms and/or be insured for the monitoring costs by the government. Thus the position of the monitoring agent in this model vis-à-vis the firm as well as the government is relational so that the model may be characterized as the relational contingent governance (RCG). However such arrangements may lead to a soft-budget tendency for the monitoring agent, i.e., it may tend to bail out firms that should be punished by the termination, because it could be less costly for them with the government protection.
Although this model is a purely theoretical construct, the traditional Japanese governance structure emulated some basic aspects of it with the so-called main bank playing the role of the relational monitoring agent. 27 From the above three models, we can deduce that three factors may be On the other hand, the stockholders themselves may be motivated to do a better job of monitoring if they can benefit from making good evaluative judgments.
Therefore, there are complementarities between the creation and sustenance of internal linkage on one hand and the stock market evaluation on the other. Complementarities can thus be dual; external as well as internal. In this model,, the board of directors ought to act not as the agent of the returns-maximizing stockholders but as the "trustees" for the stakeholders including the employees and the 28 The importance of similar complementarities between the firm and the human assets are emphasized by Rajan and Zingales [2000] managers (Blair and Stout [1999] ). It would not force the management to increase the stock value at the sacrifice of the employees, because it would be likely to destroy the valuable internal linkage. This model will work better if the government helps infrastructural services for stock markets to process corporate information more accurately and facilitate fair and equitable stock transactions. So a new mechanism of evaluating corporate firms has become a necessity.
Factors T iggering Changes in
It became evident that banks, entrenched in relational financing, could not perform a proper monitoring role in this respect. Instead, as we have noted already in Section 1, management of the corporate firm is more watchful than ever of stock market performance as an external evaluative mechanism.
Third, the progress of communication and information technology introduced dramatic impacts on the value of (tacit) information-sharing among agents within an organization, as well as within a particular collusive 31 See Aoki [2000] Chapter 10 for analytical treatments of dynamic institutional complementarities and Chapter 10 for their application to the Japanese economic history since the 1930s. Also, see Aoki [2006] for a summary exposition.
group. As far as a primary reason for exclusive information sharing was the limit of available information channels, it has been steadily overcome by the increasing capacity of digitalized communications and the associated social demands for information disclosure and transparency. Even some of the tacit know-how at work spots has become digitalizable through computer-guided design, computer-controlled machines and the like.
People no longer need to spend most of their time communicating face-to-face with a fixed number of partners to gain useful information. Mobile phones, the internet, e-mail and so on have dramatically changed the patterns, scope and range of communications among people. These impacts of information and communication technology can be considered as one of most important reasons for the apparent erosion of competitiveness of Japanese firms, which were able to take advantage of the value of tacit information-sharing in the pre-IT revolution era of the 1980s. 32 In spite of all this, however, there still seems to be valuable information which cannot be digitalized, at least within a short period of time, but can be shared among a small number of people with particular common interests and complementary areas of competence, and are potentially valuable in generating new ideas (such as business strategies, technological innovation, work improvement on spots (kaizen), etc.). 33 The paradox is that such information sharing in a niche could become potentially more valuable precisely because it is novel and scarce in the context of the increasing amount of information widely shared in the public domain.
Indeed, we have observed divergent responses among Japanese corporate firms in this regard. The better performers often belong to the type of firm that continues to foster and utilize valuable information-sharing among its employees in combination with the complementary use of emergent information technology. This type may look superficially similar to the traditional J-firm, but there is a non-negligible difference that was shaped during the past decade or so in that the leadership of management 32 See Aoki [1988] and [1990] for the view that the competitiveness of the Japanese manufacturing industry up to the late 1980s was very much reliant on the use of tacit knowledge shared among the workers on the shop floor, as well as between the workers and the management, the R&D organization and the shop floor, and the prime manufacturer and suppliers.
33 See Cowan et al [2000] and Aoki [2001] Chapter 12.1 for a taxonomy of knowledge by which some type of tacit knowledge may be regarded as economically valuable.
plays a much more active role in terms of the design of organizational architecture that fits the new information technology (e.g., a flatter, modular structure 34 ; spinning-off of affiliated firms rather than a large integrated firms 35 ), a reward system to elicit employees' cooperation and individual initiatives in a balanced way and so on. Even on-site kaizen (work improvement) movement has been reformed with more emphasis on the active roe of the local leadership. 36 In these firms the sustenance of the permanent employment system is still regarded as important, 37 although it has been modified in terms of promotion schemes and reward systems with a certain degree of competitive elements (Jackson [Chapter 10]). On the other hand, there seem to be two types of mediocre to problematic performers.
Some of them were hasty in emulating the so-called Western style reward system based on individual performance evaluation, destroying the spirit of valuable information sharing. 38 The others are led by old-fashioned managers who confine themselves to passively mediating various interest groups within an organization rather than taking the initiative in formulating a competitive business model in response to the new informational and market environments. They often try to rely on outdated collusive networks within the framework of ebbing bureau-pluralism in an attempt to hold on to losing ground. 39
The Emergence of a Hybrid Model?
In facing the challenges described above, Japanese firms have been strenuously trying to adapt their business models, human assets, and 34 For the innovativeness of the modular organization in a complex system, see Baldwin and Clark [2000] . See also Aoki [2001] Indeed, diverse patterns are being observed, and will be observed for some time, in the areas of organizational architecture, employment practices, market strategies, supplier relations, industrial relations, and so on. 41 Those diverse business models need to be compared and assessed in terms of the values generated in possible cooperation with the employees' human assets. As a mechanism of evaluation of the value of the internal linkage between a business model and human assets, product market evaluations (thus current profit) are fundamental. However, the product market can evaluate only the present outcome of the internal linkage, not possible outcomes in the future. Also, a valuable internal linkage takes time to build. In the previous section, I suggested that the bank may not be up to the task. Although they may still be in a good position to find a worsened Of course, the last condition, which I will come back to shortly, is a long way from being taken for granted.
Even if the stock market is hypothetically assumed to be informative for a moment, a corporate governance structure may not be complete with just that, however. One more critical question still remains to be resolved: How can a stock market evaluation of an individual firm be used effectively in the selection and replacement of management at the firm level? Remember the crux of corporate governance lies in the way in which management is selected and replaced when necessary. In the RCG-like institution of the traditional J-system, the control in this respect was arranged in a contingent manner. That is, in excellent and normal states of gross corporate-value of the firm, the mechanism was firmly gripped by the insiders (the top management was selected by internal promotion without any outside intervention), while in the critical state control rights shifted to the main bank. In the currently evolving situation, the insiders seem to retain effective control as far as the corporate-value state seems to be without problem. But who will exercise the disciplinary function in critical state of corporate-value? No single solution seems to have been established yet.
For small and medium-sized firms, as well as large firms with large bank loans, there may be still cases in which banks can perform major monitoring and disciplinary functions. But for large firms with rather limited bank loans, not to say of those with no bank loans, the ability of the banks to correct poor management before a real crisis becomes evident is definitely limited, even if they play certain roles in arranging a bail-out or liquidation of failed firms ex post. 43 Even in this case, the banks are not embedded in the protective framework of bureau-pluraism any more, as we noted already, so that their involvement may be more passive. 44 One possible alternative to the bank's disciplinary role would be to transform the board of directors from the traditional status of a management substructure into a 42 In fact, market prices cannot be completely perfect. If all information available in the economy can be immediately and completely reflected in market prices, then nobody would be motivated to collect information. Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] . 43 Xu [Chapter 6] provides evidences of the tendency for banks not to bail out distressed firms until bankruptcy is filed. 44 However, Arikawa and Miyajima [Chapter 2] detected some evidences of soft-budgeting tendency toward laggard firms in the early 1990s.
quasi-independent body that could discipline top executive management in critical state of corporate-value. As noted already, some firms may be heading somewhat in that direction by adopting a board structure with independent subcommittees or increasing the number of independent directors. 45 How it will work has yet to be seen, but an experiment is certainly worthwhile. 46 For start-up firms which are not mature yet for stock market evaluation, venture capital firms that act as sort of market surrogates in a relational manner are gradually gaining visibility. 47 For the time being, a variety of mechanisms may be tried for using stock market signals for the governance of individual firms, subject to evolutionary selection. 48 Even if stock market evaluation progresses in Japan, it is unlikely that Japan's corporate governance institution will transit to an SS-type model reminiscent of the American system, however. For one thing, a transition from the RCG to the RCG-EMIL hybrid model would imply a shift from the practice of sharing of information, responsibilities, and outcomes between the management and the employees, to the development of firm-specific complementary relationships between the two.
To repeat, these relationships presume more autonomous leadership roles of the management in designing business models than in the old CGS-like model, yet require specific employees' human assets fitting, and associated with, the models. This shift appears to be evolutionarily fitter than a shift to a clear demarcation of the management and the employees through individual contractual relationships as in the SS model. 49 Therefore, it might be quite 45 One of the proposals that seem to be widely supported in the current discussion on corporate governance reform is that the provision of poison pill might be allowed if the board of directors, with a majority of outside directors, approves it. Such a stipulation might provide incentives for the company to make the board more open and independent. 46 Gilson and Milhaupt [2005] suggests that, at least as currently structured, we should not expect too much from these committees. Finally, I will add a few words regarding the relationships between corporate governance and the polity. Needless to say, in order for an informative stock market to evolve, there must be an effective mechanism to filter the noise in processing corporate information and forming a fundamental stock value from it. For that to occur, there must be shared beliefs among market participants that regulatory rules are formulated and enforced in such a way that corporate information will be disclosed transparently, but not in a way that stifles active trading among a broad range of informed participants. Furthermore, these beliefs must be supported by an infrastructure of various competent professional services (e.g., accounting, the law, system engineering, financial analysis, academic theorizing and analysis),as well as trade-facilitating, information-processing technologies. In these respects, Japanese practices have yet much to be improved. Even though some reforms have been achieved in the past decade, noticeably irregular events have also emerged, such as the LD case, generated by deficiencies in regulatory rules as well as those revealing the inadequacy of the stock exchange infrastructure technologies. 51 It would not be possible to entirely control the misconduct of some players who seek profits regardless of violating the law or take advantage of loopholes in regulatory rules in a shrewd manner. But such incidents ought not to prevent nurturing the important function of corporate monitoring by the stock market. There does not seem to be a better mechanism for evaluating and predicting uncertain corporate performances that summarizes economically valuable information dispersed in the economy, so we cannot help but try to make markets work better.
In this regard, the changes in the polity occasionally referred to above may be relevant. In the traditional J-system, the primary role of regulatory though there may be some modifications of certain aspects. 50 See an interesting contribution by Sako [2006] which documents and analyzes the emergent diversity in corporate organizational structure as a result of strategic interplays between the management and the enterprise union at the firm level. 51 Immediately after the arrest of top executives at LD in January 2006, there were a tremendous number of sales bids, particularly by individuals of small holdings, which exceeded the system capacity of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and forced it to shorten trading hours for a few consecutive days.
agencies was to assure the stability of the bank-oriented financial system.
They did so by providing rents to banks in rather opaque forms of entry-and rate-regulations, as well as through backdoor agreements among parties concerned in bailing out financially distressed firms. In these arrangements, the interests of bankers and their employees, and those of regulatory bureaucrats and politicians, were intricately interwoven. But, as noted, the framework of bureau-pluralism in which such schemes were embedded is now in eclipse. In fact, the waning of bureau-pluralism in the polity and various changes in economic and social domains mutually reinforce each other, making the reversal of either one alone less likely.
Better-performing corporate firms and new entrepreneurial firms do not need the paternalistic, specific protection of politicians and the bureaucracy.
The associations of life-time occupation holders (such as doctors, nurses, post-masters, contractors, etc.) are losing their organizational integrity and thus political influence, because the members of younger generations are more diverse in their values, expectations, and behavior. These are some basic factors undermining the bureau-pluralism institution. 52 Thus, demands for deregulating rules aimed at protecting particular interest groups are rising, as well as demands for implementing rules assuring a broader spectrum of public interests (e.g., pension reform adapted to the rapidly aging population, remedying public finance deficits) and public safety (e.g., health, construction standards, child protection) are. The gradual transformation of the Finance Service Agency from an institutional agent of bureau-pluralism to a regulator sustaining an arms'-length relationship with the constituent industry, is nothing but a symptom of a bureaucratic response to these trends. Such tendency may be more conducive to the development of an institutional environment for the stock market to become more informative. The reason is that rules for stock market transactions, the disclosure of corporate information, and the like must be formulated and enforced in a neutral, arms'-length manner vis-à-vis concerned interested parties, but not by government in collusion with the incumbents in the financial market. 52 However, there is a danger that the protective framework of bureau-pluralism will be replaced by protective legislation enacted at the urging of the business community, in tacit alliance with those segments of the public who are disillusioned and indignant by some misconduct in the stock market and corporate world. I owe this comment partially to Milhaupt. Also see Rjan and Zingales [2002] for related discussion.
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